


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26 March 1957

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
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
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
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No 1. HAMMARSKJOLD-NASR TALKS




OK 2. THE SYRIAN SITUATION

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No

5. SUHRAWARDY READY TO BREAK WITH EAST PAKISTANI
LEADER



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1. HAMMARSKJOLD-NASR TALKS

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold has reported that his discussions with Egyptian president Nasr and foreign minister Fawzi have been arduous. After an eight-hour session with Nasr on 23 March, Hammarskjold told Ambassador Hare that he had found the Egyptians "strongly entrenched and difficult to move" when it came to substantive discussion of the Suez Canal problem. The secretary general said, however, that the Egyptians did appear willing to re-

ceive considerably less in direct revenue than had the old Suez Canal Company and were willing to set aside, possibly in a Swiss bank, a definite proportion of toll payments for development and compensation.

Regarding Egypt's relations with Israel, Nasr was "visibly shaken" when the secretary general on 21 March presented the Israeli demand for a "yes or no" answer to the question of whether Egypt regarded itself as a belligerent. On the Gulf of Aqaba issue, a UN adviser accompanying Hammarskjold believes the only way out is to have the UN General Assembly ask for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice.

Press reports from New York that Hammarskjold now intends to return there by this week end without visiting Israel probably stem from the extremely cold attitude the Israelis continue to display toward him. Foreign Minister Meir stated on 22 March that the secretary general was not likely to come to Israel "as he will have nothing worth while to bring."

2. THE SYRIAN SITUATION

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According to the US military attaché in Damascus, the leftist forces of Syrian army intelligence chief Colonel Sarraj and the Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party) appear to have won

"at least a temporary though not decisive victory." This group was supported by Minister of Defense Azm, the Communists, and the Egyptian embassy. One of the decisive factors was the inability of the conservative senior officer group in Damascus to resolve its difficulties with the Nufuri officer group. With the army split three ways, sufficient pressure could not be brought to oust Sarraj.

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4. SITUATION IN INDONESIA

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Indonesian president Sukarno's instructions to cabinet formateur Suwirjo on 25 March to form a cabinet of experts without regard for party affiliation is apparently an effort to side-step Moslem demands for representation which for ten days have stalled efforts to form a government. Such a "business" cabinet, if formed, would still be responsive to parliament.

Suwirjo's attempt to form a government failed when the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) insisted that the cabinet include the Masjumi party and exclude the Communists--a composition which Sukarno himself opposed as the result of Communist pressure.

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5. SUHRAWARDY READY TO BREAK WITH EAST
PAKISTANI LEADER

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Pakistan's Prime Minister Suhrawardy has apparently decided to capitalize on the opportunity presented by the resignation of Maulana Bhashani, as president of the East Pakistani branch of

Suhrawardy's Awami League, to break openly with the powerful Bengali leader. The prime minister's attempt to consolidate his leadership of the party in the eastern province and cleanse it of dissident leftist elements will have wide repercussions in both East and West Pakistan, probably resulting in a realignment of left-wing forces outside the Awami League under Bhashani's leadership.

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Suhrawardy regards the resignation as an attempt by Bhashani to stimulate an irresistible demand that he continue in office, thereby strengthening his influence over the Awami League in East Pakistan. While some league leaders fear facing the future without Bhashani's potent demagoguery to bolster them, others are pressing the prime minister to make use of the proffered resignation to prevent Bhashani from forming rival Awami League organizations in both provinces.

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Suhrawardy also plans to address Dacca University students and the general public, who have given fervent support to Bhashani during the past, in an effort to demonstrate conclusively his break with the religious leader and promote a strong opinion against him. Serious disturbances could easily result from these open meetings.

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